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Abstract 
This paper studies investment in health and education in a life-cycle model. Health 
investment enhances survival to old age by improving health from its endowed level. The 
model predicts two distinctive phases of development. When income is low enough, the 
economy has no health investment and little savings, leading to slow growth.  When income 
grows, health investment will become positive and the saving rate will rise, leading to higher 
life expectancy and faster growth. A health subsidy can move the economy from the first 
phase to the next. Subsidies on health and education investments can improve welfare. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Between countries with low and high life expectancy, there are striking differences in their 
school enrollments, investment-to-GDP ratios, health spending, and growth rates of per 
capita income. According to the data set in Barro and Lee (1994), in countries with life 
expectancy in 1960 below 50 (with a mean of 43.4 years), the average ratio of private 
investment to GDP was 14%, the average secondary school enrollment ratio was 17.6%, and 
the average growth rate of per capita GDP was 1.4%, for the period 1960-1989. By contrast, 
in countries with life expectancy in 1960 above 65, the corresponding average figures were 
22%, 71% and 2.96%, respectively. With no exception, countries with life expectancy in 
1960 below 50 (28 in total) are poor and their very low life expectancy is a consequence of 
little health investment. On the other hand, those with life expectancy in 1960 above 65 are 
developed countries (24 in total), and are mostly the members of the OECD. These rich 
countries with much longer life expectancy have had much higher health spending than those 
at the other end of the spectrum.
1  
Similar to the cross-country comparison, there were upward trends in the ratios of 
health and education spending to GDP and in life expectancy in the time-series data of the 
United States in Table 1 for the period 1870-2000. The postwar average growth rate of per 
capita GDP also appeared to be higher than the prewar average growth rate in the United 
States, as in many other developed countries according to Maddison (1991). Though the 
long-term saving rate did not have a discernable trend in the United States, it typically had an 
upward trend in other developed countries as documented in Maddison (1992). It is thus 
important to explore the interaction between life expectancy and growth by investigating 
household decisions on health investment, education investment and life-cycle savings. 
Moreover, in many developed countries health and education expenditures are heavily 
subsidized or publicly provided through distortionary taxes. To a lesser extent, health and 
education expenditures are also subsidized in some less developed countries. Thus, it is also 
important to investigate the impacts of these subsidies on household decisions about health  3
spending, education spending and life-cycle savings. Through this investigation, we can learn 
how these subsidies affect life expectancy, output growth and welfare.     
Recently, the relationship between longevity and household decisions on savings and 
education investment has received a great deal of attention. The typical view is that rising 
longevity or declining mortality encourages savings and education investment and hence 
promotes economic growth. See, e.g., Skinner (1985), Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995), de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001), 
Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro (2002, 2003), Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2003), and 
Zhang and Zhang (2005). However, the rate of survival or death is usually assumed to be 
exogenous in these papers. Though some studies have considered health investment, e.g. 
Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), Philipson and Becker (1998) and Leung, Zhang and Zhang 
(2004), they have not considered education investment at the same time, and therefore their 
models do not permit sustainable growth in the long run. Intuitively, economic growth 
promises more resource available for future improvements in health care and life expectancy, 
while rising life expectancy may in turn motivate savings and education investment.  
Some recent studies have considered health and education expenditures together in a 
life-cycle model. Among them, Chakraborty and Das (2005) focus on how the distribution of 
wealth interacts with health investment and education investment in accounting for the high 
intergenerational correlation of economic status and persistent disparities in health status 
between the rich and the poor. Also, Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2005) find large growth 
effects of an AIDS epidemic and relatively small effects of policies such as the subsidization 
of AIDS medication.   
In this paper we investigate health investment, education investment and life-cycle 
savings in an endogenous growth model. Health investment improves survival to old age that 
has a lower bound supported by an endowment of health capital to each young individual. 
Unlike Chakraborty and Das (2005) and Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2005), however, we 
focus on whether the equilibrium solution can differ significantly in different stages of  4
development in a way that resembles what we observe in the real would.  Also, we explore 
how subsidies on education spending or health spending influence capital accumulation, 
health investment and welfare in different stages of development. 
Our model predicts two distinctive phases of development. When income is sufficiently 
low, there is no health investment, because the marginal utility of consumption would then 
exceed the marginal utility of health investment given the lower bound on the expected rate 
of survival. Corresponding to this minimum rate of survival to old age, the saving rate is at 
its lowest level, leading to very slow growth. When income grows, health investment will 
become positive and the saving rate will rise substantially, leading to higher life expectancy 
and faster growth. These results capture some of the stylized facts mentioned earlier.  
Interestingly, a health subsidy can move the economy from the no-health-investment 
phase to the next, a transition that brings about higher life expectancy, greater savings, and 
faster growth. A growing economy in this model converges to a unique balanced growth path. 
A health subsidy does not affect the balanced growth rate, while an education subsidy 
increases it under plausible conditions. These subsidies through a wage income tax can also 
improve welfare with an externality from average health spending in the formation of health 
capital, particularly in the short run. Numerically, the ideal subsidy rates are found to be 
around 60% for both education and health expenditures. The findings support recent reform 
in some developed countries converting a public health and education system into one with 
shared financial responsibility between the state and households.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the model. Sections III 
and IV provide analytical and numerical results, respectively. Section V summarizes our 
findings and discusses further extensions. The last section concludes. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
The economy consists of overlapping generations of agents who live for three periods (one 
period in childhood and two in adulthood). Children learn to embody human capital through  5
education, young adults work, and old adults live in retirement. Each worker gives birth to 
one child and each working generation has a mass L. Survival from childhood to young 
adulthood is certain, while survival to old age is uncertain at a rate of  ) ( t h P  that  is  
increasing and concave in health capital  t h . We abstract from child mortality and the choice 
of the number of children to keep the model tractable. Workers make decisions on life-cycle 
savings s, investment in health m, and investment in the education of their children q. 
Health capital accumulates according to: 
(1)  h m m A h t t h t + =
−α α 1 ) ( ,  
where  t m  refers to average investment in health, h  refers to an endowment of health capital 
to each young adult,  0 > h A   indicates the effectiveness of the health technology, and 
01 α <<  indicates the relative importance of an individual￿s own health spending versus 
average health spending in the economy. One rationale for the inclusion of average health 
investment in the formation of health capital is that when there is little health spending on 
average, there would be lack of health professionals and health care facilities as in many poor 
countries. In this scenario, health spending by a single agent can hardly enhance his health 
status. The endowed component of health capital reflects the fact that there is still a chance 
expected to survive to old age even without health spending. As we will see, this endowment 
of health capital can lead to realistic transitional dynamics in this model. 





1 t t e t e q A e , 
where  t t e e   and   1 + stand for the human capital of the child and his parent, respectively, and  t q  
is the amount of education spending. In addition,  0 e A >   is an efficiency parameter in 
education and  1 0 < <η   measures the relative importance of education spending versus 
parental human capital in education.  
The rate of survival to old age is an exponential function of health capital:  6
(3)   ) exp( / 1 1 t t h P − = , 
which is clearly increasing and concave in health capital. 
Final production uses physical capital, K, and effective labor,  e L : 
(4) 
φ φ − =
1 ) ( t t y t e L K A Y ,     
where  1 0   and   0 < < > φ y A   are the total factor productivity parameter and the share 
parameter of physical capital, respectively. Production inputs are compensated according to 




1 ) / ( 1 t t y t k e A r , 
(6) 
φ φ ) / ( ) 1 ( t t y t e k A w − = , 
where w and r are the real wage rate and the real interest rate, respectively.  
We assume a perfect annuity market through which workers invest their savings in 
exchange for income for retirement conditional on survival. Under this assumption, savings 
left by savers who die at the end of working age will be shared by the rest of savers who 
survive to old age. This assumption implies that the rate of return on savings is equal to 
t t P r / ) 1 ( 1 + +  where  P   is the average rate of survival (i.e. the portion of the working 
population surviving to old age). The household budget constraints are given by: 
(7)  (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) tt w t m t e t t we m q s c τπ π −= −+−+ + , 
(8)  t t t t P r s z / ) 1 ( 1 1 + + + = . 
Here, health and education expenditures are subsidized at respective rates  e m π π   and   
(funded by a wage income tax  w τ ), c refers to working-age consumption, s refers to life-
cycle savings, and z stands for old-age consumption. Also, we assume inelastic supply of one 
unit of labor per worker to keep things simple.  
The government budget constraint is balanced in every period: 
(9)  t e t m t t w q m e w π π τ + = .   7
In this model, the tax rate  w τ will be treated as a variable, while the subsidy rates,  e π and m π , 
will be treated as policy parameters. 
































U ,  ; 1 , , 0 < < θ ξ δ   
  . 1   if   ln ln 1 1 = + + = + + θ ξ δ t t t t t e z P c U  
That is, an agent derives utility from working-age consumption, old-age consumption 
(conditional on survival), and the education outcome of his child. The parameters in (10) 
include two discounting factors,  ξ δ   and   , and one constant coefficient of relative risk 
aversion,  .   θ  The presence of the product  ) 1 /(
1 θ
θ −
− P z for  1 ≠ θ , or  , 1 for  ln = θ z P  in (10) 
introduces non-concavity in the utility function. To ensure the needed concavity for any 
interior solution to be optimal, we require . 1 0 ≤ <θ Note that the use of a CES utility 
function is typical in endogenous growth models to which our model belongs.  
The capital market clears when 
(11)  t t s k = +1 , 
where  k=K/L is physical capital per worker. Correspondingly, output per worker is 
.
1 α α − = t t y t e k A y   In equilibrium, we expect P P m m e e = = =   and , by symmetry, because 
workers in each generation are identical ex ante in this model. 
 
III. EQUILIBRIUM AND RESULTS 
Taking  ) , , , , ( 1 t t t t t P m e w r + as given, the household problem in period t may be formulated as  
(12)  +
−
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           11 [( 1) ( 1 )( 1) / ( 1 )] tt t w t m t e tt t t we m q z P r c λτ π π ++ −− −−−− + − , 
by choice of nonnegative variables  ) , , , ( 1 t t t t q m z c + , where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.    8
The first-order conditions of the household problem are given below for  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ θ : 
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For the log utility case, we can simply set  1 = θ  in (13), (14) and (16), and replace  
1
1
1 ln  with  ) 1 /( +
−
+ − t t z z θ
θ   in (15). The first-order conditions indicate that the net marginal 
benefits of all the choice variables are non-positive. If the net marginal benefit of a household 
variable is strictly negative, then this variable must be equal to zero. Obviously, when 
consumption and education investment approach zero, their marginal benefits will approach 
infinity. However, when health investment approaches zero, its marginal benefit does not 
approach infinity because  h ht ≥ provides a lower bound on  ) exp( t h  or an upper bound on 
) exp( t h −  in (15). In other words, there may be a corner solution for health investment.    
We give the condition for a corner solution for health investment below and relegate 
the proof to the Appendix: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. For small enough initial capital stocks  ) , ( 0 0 e k  relative to a given h,  w e  
have  . 0   some for    0 ≥ = t mt  Subsidizing health investment can avoid such a corner solution. 
Proposition 1 is consistent with the fact that many poor countries suffer from lack of 
health services with little health spending. The intuition is that when households are so poor 
that their marginal utility of consumption exceeds their marginal utility of health investment, 
they are unwilling to divert their small income for health investment. This is mainly because  9
the expected rate of survival is bounded below by endowed health capital such that the 
marginal utility of health investment is bounded above. Another interesting result in 
Proposition 1 is that governments can induce positive health investment by subsidizing it. 
With a corner solution for health investment, equations  0 = t m , (13), (14), (16) and the 
budget constraints lead to the evolution of human and physical capital below: 
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e y A A > 0. 
For some parameterizations (e.g. a large y A ), there exists sustainable growth in this 
corner solution without health investment, as in endogenous growth models with both human 
and physical capital in the literature. In a growing economy, health investment will 
eventually become positive. 
With an interior solution for health investment, the first-order conditions of the 
household problem imply: 
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θ η θ π η ξ
− − −
+ − = t e t t e t c q e A e ) 1 ( ) / (
1
1 , 
(21)  ) 1 ]( 1 ) )[exp( 1 ( θ π α − − − = t m h t h A s , 
for  . 1 0 < <θ  Further, the budget constraints (7) to (9) imply  t t t t t t c s q m e w + + + = .  
From these equations, plus  t t s k = +1  and the technologies in production and education, 
we can determine the evolution of  ) , ( t t k e  for  1 0 < <θ  with positive health investment as:  10
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θη θ η η η .  
In the log utility case, the evolution of human and physical capital is a special case of (22) 
and (23) with  1 = θ . 
According to (21), in a growing economy in which  t t s k = +1  grows  over  time, 
) exp( t h will also grow over time and therefore the rate of survival  ) ( t h P  will converge to 1. 
We now establish the convergence of a growing economy to its unique balanced growth path 
below and relegate the proof to the Appendix.  
 
PROPOSITION 2. If  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 > − − − − η φ θ φ , a growing economy starting with either 
0 = m  or  0 > m   converges to a unique balanced growth path with  1 ) ( lim = ∞ → t t h P.  T h e  
balanced growth rate is positive if  y A is large enough. 
The condition in Proposition 2 for a growing economy to converge to its unique 
balanced growth path is satisfied if the share parameter associated with effective labor 
exceeds that associated with physical capital in final production, as is widely accepted in the  11
literature, i.e. if  φ φ > − 1 . When total factor productivity, measured by y A , is high enough, 
the balanced growth rate is positive. 
We now investigate how subsidies on health and education spending affect the 
economy. The proof is relegated to the Appendix. 
 
PROPOSITION 3. With  1 0 < <θ and an initial state  ) ( , t t k e , a health subsidy raises health 
spending but has ambiguous effects on savings and education spending; it has no effect on 
the balanced growth rate. An education subsidy increases education spending but has 
ambiguous effects on savings and health spending; it also increases the balanced growth rate 
if  y A is sufficiently large under  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 η φ θ φ − − − − >0. 
The results in Proposition 3 are intuitive. Concerning the spending that is directly 
subsidized, the positive net effect indicates that the substitution effect of each of the subsidies 
dominates its income effect. For other types of spending that are not directly subsidized, the 
net effects of the subsidies will depend on parameterizations and are likely to be negative 
because the substitution effects may be negative. On the balanced growth path, the balanced 
growth rate is dependent on the ratio of physical to human capital. Because the rate of 
survival on the balanced growth path is equal to one, the health subsidy can no longer 
increase the survival rate. In this case, the health subsidy may have proportionate effects on 
physical and human capital accumulation, as it does in this model. Therefore, the health 
subsidy has no effect on the capital ratio and the growth rate on the balanced growth path in 
our model. On the other hand, by promoting education spending the education subsidy can 
increase the balanced growth rate as long as total factor productivity  y A  is high enough and 
the share parameter of labor exceeds the share parameter of capital in production.   
In the case of the log utility with  1 = θ , the equilibrium solution with positive health 
spending can be determined by the following equations:  12
(24)  t
e
t t t t t q m h m e w }
1





− − + + + = , 
(25)  + − + + + − − −
−
t e y e t e h q A A q A ln )] 1 ( [ ln ln ) 1 ( ln { ) 1 (
1 φ η φ φ ξη φ π δ φ π δα
φ  
   } )) ( exp( ) 1 ( ))] ( exp( 1 ln[ ) 1 ( ln ) 1 )( 1 ( t t m t t t m h m h e π ξη φ φ η − = − − − − − − + , 
where the large expression inside the bracket {￿} on the LHS of (25) is equal to  1 ln + t z  and 
. ) ( h m A m h t h t t + =  We establish the following result and relegate the proof to the Appendix: 
 
PROPOSITION 4. With the log utility and an initial state  ) ( , t t k e , a health subsidy raises 
health spending,  reduces education spending, and has an ambiguous effect on savings; it has 
no effect on the balanced growth rate. An education subsidy raises education spending, but 
has ambiguous effects on savings and health spending. If  φ φ > − 1 , the education subsidy  
raises the balanced growth rate unless the subsidy rate is too high.  
The results with the log utility are similar to those with  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ θ  in most aspects. One 
difference is that in the case of the log utility, a health subsidy reduces education spending. 
Another difference is that the education subsidy can increase the balanced growth rate if the 
subsidy rate is not too high under  φ φ > − 1 .  
 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
In order to reveal the quantitative implications of the model, we now turn to numerical 
simulations. We want to see how significant is the difference in life expectancy and growth 
rates across the two distinctive stages with or without health investment on an equilibrium 
path over 15 periods or generations (with 25 years in one period). We also want to see the 
welfare implication of subsidies on health and education spending, and find the preferred 
range of the subsidy rates.  
On the technical side of our numerical simulation, the system of the nonlinear equations 
in the previous section determines the following 13 variables:  13
( w t t t t t t t t t t t t w r P y k e h s q m z c τ , , , , , , , , , , , 1 1 , + + ),  
where  1 / ) 1 ( − + = t t t t P r k z  from backdating (8) and (11) by one period. Using these equations, 
we can update the state variables from  ) , ( t t e k to  ) , ( 1 1 + + t t e k and then calculate 
φ φ
−
+ + + = +
1
1 1 1 ) / ( 1 t t yt t k e A r   to evaluate old-age consumption  1 + t z  and  welfare  . t U  We  can 
also do so by solving the evolution equations of human and physical capital from  ) , ( t t e k to 
) , ( 1 1 + + t t e k  first and then finding solutions for the other variables. To distinguish between the 
corner and interior solutions concerning health investment, we compute the marginal utility 
of consumption and that of health investment in each period to determine whether the 
condition for a corner solution for health investment is satisfied. If it is satisfied, we replace 
(15) by  0 = m ; otherwise, equation (15) holds in strict equality with  0 > m .  
Concerning parameterization, we first consider the balanced growth path and then 
consider initial conditions for rich and poor countries. As in Proposition 2, the rate of 
survival from working age to old age equals 1 on the balanced growth path, which exceeds 
the observed rates of survival in all countries. In developed countries, the rate of survival 
from age 20 to 65 is close to 80-90% in recent years according to the Life Tables from the 
World Health Organization.
2 For example, this rate of survival was 79% for males and 87% 
for females in 2000 in the United States and higher in some other OECD countries like 
Australia, Canada, Japan and Sweden. Since the rate of survival to old age in these countries 
is close to 1, we set the balanced growth rate as the average annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita 2.9% for the period 1960-1689 in countries with 1960 life expectancy above 65; see 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1994) that used purchasing power adjusted output growth data in 
the Penn World Table. In addition, we set a 20% saving rate, a 10% ratio of education 
spending to output and 60% subsidies on both education and health expenditures for the 
balanced growth path.
3   We calibrate our model to this balanced growth path with 60% 
subsidy rates on education spending and health spending. We also consider cases with no  14
subsidies or with different subsidy rates. A common parameterization in all of our reported 
numerical results is given below: 
3
1
, 4 , 3 . 3 , 5 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 3 . 0 , 5 . 0 , 85 . 0 ,
4
1
= = = = = = = = = = φ η ξ δ θ α y e h A A A h . 
In this parameterization, setting the share parameter of physical capital at 1/3 is widely 
used in the literature. Setting  ) 1 /( 1 ρ δ + = =0.5 and assuming one period as 25 years, the 
corresponding annual rate of time preference is equal to = ρ 0.028, which is within its usual 
range used in the literature. The values of the other parameters, which are either unavailable 
or vary significantly in the literature, are chosen so as to calibrate our model to the particular 
balanced growth path specified above. 
We select three cases of numerical results to report. All of these cases start from the 
same initial capital stocks  9506 . 0 0 = e and  0481 . 0 0 = k which are low enough to allow for the 
corner and interior solutions to mimic poor and rich countries over 15 periods (generations) 
or more. The first case has no subsidies at all, the second case has a 60% health subsidy and 
the third case has 60% subsidies on both health and education spending. These cases are 
reported in Figures 1 to 3. Each of these figures has four panels. Panel (a) reports 
proportional allocations of output to savings, health and education. Panel (b) reports the 
growth rate of output and the rate of survival from working age to old age. Panel (c) reports 
health spending and log output per worker. Panel (d) gives the level of welfare. 
In the first three periods in Figure 1, there is no health investment (Figures 1a and 1c), 
as output per worker is initially low at 1.42. When income becomes higher, health investment 
becomes positive (Figures 1b and 1c) and rises over time. The ratio of health investment to 
output increases in period four through to seven, peaks at a level exceeding 10%, and then 
falls gradually in the long run. Corresponding to the time path of health investment, the rate 
of survival is very low initially (below 0.1) and then rises toward its long-run level (equal to 
one) in Figure 1b. Matching a low rate of survival, the saving rate is very low initially and 
therefore the growth rate of output per worker is low as well (below 10% and 1%,  15
respectively). The ratio of education spending to output is relatively smooth throughout the 
entire equilibrium path (about 4-6%). When health investment raises the rate of survival at 
higher income levels, the saving rate and the growth rate of output all converge to their long 
run levels (20% and 2%, respectively), that are higher than in the first phase without health 
investment. These patterns of movements of the key variables over time are similar to those 
in the cross-country comparison between poor and rich countries.   
The patterns of movements of the variables in the several periods with a rising ratio of 
health spending to output in Figure 1 also capture some features in the time series data in the 
United States and other developed countries. According to Table 1, there were upward trends 
in the ratio of health spending to GDP, the ratio of education spending to GDP, and life 
expectancy in the United States. The substantial rises in health investment relative to output 
and in life expectancy are echoed in periods 4 to 7 in Figure 1. Also, the postwar average 
growth rate appeared to be higher than the prewar average growth rate in the United States, 
as in other 15 developed countries from 1870 to 1990 according to Maddison (1991). This 
overall rise in the long-term average growth rate is reflected in Figure 1b.  
As mentioned earlier, according to Maddison (1992) there was a discernable upward 
trend in the long-term saving rates of 11 developed countries for the period 1870-1987 (with 
the United States as the only exception), as captured in periods from four through to seven in 
our Figure 1. For example, the average saving rate of Canada rose from 9.1% in 1870-1889 
to 14.4% in 1914-1938, and further to 23.4% in 1960-1973. Since the mid-1970s, it had 
declined slightly to 20.4% in 1981-1987. It appears that Figure 1a has a better match with the 
saving rate in Canada than in the United States. This is perhaps because Canada started with 
much lower per capita GDP in 1870 than the United States: 1330 versus 2244 dollars (the 
1985 US$), respectively. With such a low level of per capita GDP, Canada was in an early 
stage of development in the 1870s, which fits better into the first few periods in our Figure 1.  
In Figure 2 with a 60% health subsidy, the economy jumps to the phase with positive 
health investment immediately in the first period as predicted in Propositions 1 and 2.  16
Compared to Figure 1, now the health subsidy raises the rate of survival and the saving rate 
substantially on the transitional path. As a result, the growth rate is higher in the first few 
periods on the transitional path with the health subsidy than without. Also greater is the 
short-run level of welfare in Figure 2d with the health subsidy (8.99656 in period one) than 
in Figure 1d without the subsidy (8.98961 in period one). The intuition for this welfare 
improvement arises from the positive externality from average health spending to the 
formation of health capital of every worker. Intuitively, the externality leads to under-
investment in health in the first place, and hence leaves room for welfare improvements. In 
the long run, the balanced growth rate in Figure 2b with the health subsidy is the same as that 
in Figure 1b without any subsidy, as shown in Proposition 3. 
In Figure 3 with a 60% education subsidy and a 60% health subsidy, the economy 
initially has just one period with zero health investment and moves to the phase with positive 
health investment in the second period. Compared to Figure 2 with the health subsidy alone, 
the addition of the education subsidy reduces health spending, savings and welfare (8.94953) 
in the initial period but raises them later on by accelerating human capital accumulation and 
output growth. Compared to Figure 1 without any subsidy, Figure 3 with both subsidies has 
higher spending on health and education and higher savings, leading to a higher growth rate. 
But the welfare level in Figure 3d with 60% subsidies on both education and health 
expenditures is initially lower than in Figure 1d without any subsidy. From the second period 
onward, the welfare level in Figure 3d is higher than in Figures 1d and 2d.  
This welfare comparison suggests that poor countries may benefit more from 
subsidizing health spending alone than from subsidizing both health and education spending 
in the short run. In addition to these subsidies, poor countries may also benefit from 
subsidizing investment in physical capital or savings. The reason lies in the first-order 
condition with respect to health investment (15). That is, when the externality in health 
investment causes under-investment in health, a subsidy on savings can help raise the 
marginal benefit of health investment through increasing expected old-age consumption and  17
hence encouraging more health investment. Also, like the education subsidy, a saving 
subsidy can promote capital accumulation and economy growth. 
Comparing the balanced growth paths in Figures 1 to 3, the case with 60% subsidies on 
both education and health spending has the highest ratio of education spending to output and 
consequently the highest balanced growth rate. The balanced growth rate is the same in 
Figures 1 and 2 without subsidy or with a 60% health subsidy as in Propositions 3 and 4. 
To focus on the welfare ranking with different combinations of subsidies in rich 
countries, we select a new initial condition with  936 . 11 0= e  and  425 . 2 . Without any subsidy, 
this new initial condition gives a level of output per worker at 28.22, which is almost 20 
times as much as the output level 1.42 with the previous initial condition for poor countries. 
This resembles a comparison between a high income level $20,000 in developed countries 
and a low income level $1,000 in poor countries. Also, the corresponding rate of survival is 
equal to 0.79, which is close to the current rate of survival from age 20 to 65 for males in the 
United States. In this case with no subsidy, the welfare level in the initial period is 16.64372.  
When there is an education subsidy at a rate 40%, 60% or 80%, the corresponding 
welfare level in the initial period changes to 16.6819, 16.66663, or 16.47193 in descending 
order. Among these welfare levels, the one with a 40% or 60% education subsidy is higher 
than that without subsidies, while the one with an 80% education subsidy is lower than that 
without subsidies. When there is a health subsidy at a rate 40%, 60% or 80%, the welfare 
level changes to 16.83126, 16.89986 or 19.90546 in ascending order, all of which exceed the 
level without subsidies. When there are equal subsidies on both education and health 
expenditures at a rate 40%, 60% or 80%, the welfare level changes to 16.88662, 16.97430 or 
16.92425, peaking in the middle of the three subsidy rates. Also, when both subsidies are 
used, the welfare level is higher than when one of the subsidies is used alone. The result 
indicates that the optimal policy in rich countries is a combination of both subsidies at a rate 
around 60%.  
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V. SUMMARIES AND EXTENSIONS 
Our model captures some stylized facts over different stages of development. When the 
initial income level is very low, so are health investment and savings relative to income. As a 
consequence, the rate of survival and the rate of output growth are low. When the income 
level rises over time, both health investment and savings will increase rapidly relative to 
income for some periods, leading to higher life expectancy and faster growth. Eventually, the 
ratio of health investment to output will fall when survival to old age becomes almost certain, 
whereas the saving rate and the rate of survival converge to steady-state levels on the 
balanced growth path. In our numerical results, the balanced growth rate is much higher than 
in the corner solution without health investment. The contrasting patterns of these variables 
at low and high levels of income resemble what we observe between poor and rich countries 
or across different stags of development in time series data in some developed countries.  
Regarding public policies, we find that a health subsidy increases health investment and 
may raise or reduce the growth rate of output on the transitional path. However, it has no 
effect on the balanced growth rate in the long run. In terms of its welfare effect, economies 
with little health investment and low income may benefit more from subsidizing health 
investment than from subsidizing both health and education investment comprehensively. On 
the contrary, economies with high income may benefit more from subsidizing both than from 
subsidizing just one of them. This also captures the fact that rich countries have more public 
spending on education and health as fractions of GDP than poor countries.  
Our model can be extended in several directions. First, one can assume that health 
capital may contribute to utility directly in addition to its role in enhancing survival as in 
Corrigan, Glomm and Mendes (2005). Similarly, one can assume that health capital can 
enhance productivity as in Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2005) and Chakraborty and Das 
(2005). These additional motives for health investment may induce more health spending. 
However, since health capital is bounded below by its endowed level  h ht ≥ , a corner 
solution for health investment may still occur in this extended version when income is  19
sufficiently low such that the desire for consumption dominates the desire for health 
investment. Even with positive health investment at low income levels, the ratio of health 
investment to output is likely to be low because of the endowed component of health capital.  
Second, one may assume idiosyncratic health shocks in the form of terminal diseases 
like AIDS or cancer that may make survival to old age impossible as in Corrigan, Glomm 
and Mendez. Correspondingly, one may assume another component of health expenditure 
that contributes to utility by easing the suffering from such terminal diseases but does not 
contribute to the rate of survival to old age. In this second extension, average health spending 
is expected to be always positive due to the new component of health expenditure. However, 
the component of health spending aiming at enhancing survival to old age is expected to 
behave in the same way as in the original version of the model.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have investigated how health investment interacts with education investment 
and life-cycle savings in an endogenous growth model. We have found that the equilibrium 
solutions for some key variables depend critically on the initial level of income per capita. 
When initial income is sufficiently low, the desire for consumption is stronger than the desire 
for health, resulting in zero health investment and hence a low rate of survival. The low rate 
of survival in turn leads to little savings for old age and slow growth in output per worker. 
When income becomes high enough in a growing economy, households will be willing to 
strike a balance among health, education and savings, leading to higher life expectancy and 
faster growth than in the early stage without health investment. The findings capture some 
stylized facts in cross-country comparison between poor and rich countries as well as in time 
series data in the United States.  
Interestingly, subsidizing health spending can move an economy from the no-health-
spending equilibrium to the other, a transition that brings about higher life expectancy, 
greater savings, higher welfare and perhaps faster growth on the transitional path.  20
Subsidizing both education and health spending may reduce welfare in the short run for poor 
countries but will lead to higher life expectancy, faster growth and higher welfare in the 
future. An example of this transition in recent history is the development in the last several 
decades in China compared to the rest of the developing world. Starting with one of the 
lowest levels of income and life expectancy but with substantial state funding for education 
and health services, China has achieved not only phenomenal economic growth but also one 
of the highest levels of life expectancy in the developing world.
4  
Starting with high income and positive health investment, we have also found that the 
initial generation of workers are better off from subsidizing both health and education 
expenditures at realistic rates around 60%. This result is consistent with the practice of 
substantial government spending on health and education in many developed countries. The 
welfare gain is attributed to the externality of average health spending in the formation of 
health capital and the short-sightedness of agents in a typical overlapping-generations model 
concerning education. However, further rises in the subsidy rate on both education and health 
expenditures, say 80% or over, are found to reduce welfare in our numerical results, although 
the higher subsidy rates may yield higher welfare compared to cases without any subsidies. 
This result supports recent reforms in public funding for education and health, from one with 
almost free public access to education and health services to one with some sort of shared 
financial responsibility between the state and households.   21
 APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
From the first-order conditions, we must have 
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, we must have  0 = t m  for some  0 ≥ t . 
Obviously, one can always increase the health subsidy rate  m π  such that the user cost of 
health investment (the RHS of the above inequalities) is equal to or below the marginal 
benefit (the LHS) in order to induce positive health investment. Finally, it is easy to verify 
that the result holds for the log utility case when setting  1 = θ  and  replacing 
1
1
1 ln  with  ) 1 /( +
−
+ − t t z z θ
θ  in the above inequalities.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Consider first that the economy starts from a corner solution with m = 0. The convergence of 
this economy is based on equation (18). For convenience, let  i Γ  be the coefficient on the 
ratio  e k /  in (18), denote  e k x / =  and rewrite (18) as 
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which implies the convergence of  t x , that is,  ∞ ∞ → = x xt t lim . Taking  ∞ → t   in (A-1) and 
dividing it by  ∞ x ,  ∞ x is determined by 
(A-2) 
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Here, the LHS is a positive constant, while the RHS is increasing monotonically with 
∞ x (starting below 1 Γ ) because all the exponents of  ∞ x in (A-2) are positive under 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 > − − − − η φ θ φ . Thus,  ∞ x is unique under this condition. Corresponding to the 
unique  ∞ ∞ ∞ = e k x / , there is a unique balanced growth rate from (17) with  . 0 = m  From 
Proposition 1, since a growing economy will eventually have  0 > t m , it will not converge to 
the balanced growth path with  . 0 = m  
Now we consider the case with  0 > m . According to (21), when  t t s k = +1  grows over 
time,  ) exp( t h will also grow over time and therefore the rate of survival P will converge to 1. 
Thus, when  ∞ → t , equations (19) and (20) plus the education technology imply   23
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This equation links the long-run growth rate of human capital to the long-run ratio of 
physical to human capital. Given  ) , 0 ( ∞ ∈ t e  and  ) , 0 ( ∞ ∈ t k  in  period  t,  1 + t e  must  be 
bounded according to the education technology and the household constraint on education 
spending  t q . That is, the growth rate of human capital is bounded in every period.  By (A-3), 
the capital ratio  ∞ ∞ e k /  must be bounded as well. Rewrite (22) as 
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= + + . 
Divide both sides of this version of (22) by  t e , let  ∞ → t and  ∞ → t e , and use (A-3) to 
replace the growth rate by the ratio of physical to human capital. In doing so, the ratios of all 
the constant terms in (22) to  t e  will converge to zero as  ∞ → t e in the long run. Because we 
have noted that the long-run growth rate and the long-run capital ratio are all bounded, the 
last term on the LHS and the first term on the RHS of (22) will also be driven to zero when 
they are divided by a rising . t e As  t e grows,  t t e e / ) (ln   also converges to zero since 
0 / 1 lim / ) (log lim = = ∞ → ∞ → x x x x x . In the long run, the resultant equation containing the 
remaining terms in (22) governs the evolution of the capital ratio: 
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As in (A-1), the capital ratio in the above equation will converge to ∞ ∞ e k / :  24
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Note that all the terms in (A-4) are positive. The LHS is a constant, while the RHS 
depends on  ∞ ∞ e k /   which will have a unique solution if the RHS is increasing with it 
monotonically. To this end, we only need to show that all the exponents of  ∞ ∞ e k / are 
positive. The last one is positive because  ) ( ) 1 ( )] 1 ( 1 )][ 1 ( 1 [ θ η θφ θ η θ φ F ≡ − − − − − − >0 as 
 0 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 0 ( > − − = η φ F ,   
 0 )] 1 ( 1 [ ) 1 ( )] 1 ( 1 [ )] 1 ( 1 [ ) ( > − − + = − − − − + − − = ′ θ φ η φηθ η φ θ φ η θ η φ θ F , 
under . 1 0 ≤ <θ  The other exponents of  ∞ ∞ e k /  are positive under  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 η φ θ φ − − − − >0. 
Given this condition there is a unique finite solution for ∞ ∞ e k / , implying that physical and 
human capital (hence also output) must share the same balanced growth rate in the long run. 
Combining this with (A-3), the balanced growth rate must also be finite and unique.  
In order to see whether the balanced growth rate can be positive, we set  0 = e π and 
substitute (A-3) into (A-4) to replace  ∞ ∞ e k /  by the balanced growth rate ∞ g :  
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+ g Ay . 
The LHS of (A-5) is increasing with y A , while the RHS is decreasing directly with  y A . Also, 
the RHS is increasing with  ∞ g  because all the exponents of  ∞ + g 1 are positive. Thus, we 
have 0 / > ∞ y dA dg . That is, if  y A  is large enough then 0 > ∞ g .  25
In the log utility case with  1 = θ , the analysis of convergence to a unique balanced 
growth path is similar by imposing 1 = θ  in (A-3) and (A-4). Also, if  y A  is large enough 
then 0 > ∞ g , which can be easily verified by setting  1 = θ  in (A-5). 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Taking logs on (19)￿(21) and making substitutions, we have 
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Note that equations (A-6) and (A-9) contain implicit solutions for  t t q m   and  via 
h m A h t h t + =  and (5). Taking total differentiation, we get: 
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While the signing is obvious for      , 3 2 a a and  j b  for  all  j, the signing of  1 a is more 
involved. The sign of  1 a depends on )] exp( ) 1 ( 1 [ t h − − − − θ φ θ  or  . ) exp( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ θ φ θ − − − t h  
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which implies  . 0 1 > a  Now, it is obvious that  0 / > ∂ ∂ m t m π  and  0 / > ∂ ∂ e t q π . The effects of 
the health subsidy on savings and education spending are ambiguous, and so are the effects 
of the education subsidy on savings and health spending.   
According to (A-3) and (A-4), the health subsidy has no effect on the balanced growth 
rate since it does not appear in these two equations. Differentiating (A-3) and (A-4) with 
respect to  ) 1 /( 1 e π − yields the following condition for  0 / > ∞ e d dg π : 
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where ∞ g is the balanced growth rate. For ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ θ , a larger  y A  means a greater LHS, both 
directly and indirectly through raising  ∞ g under 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 > − − − − η φ θ φ , as shown below 
(A-5). Thus, the education subsidy increases the balanced growth rate if  y A is sufficiently 
large and if  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 > − − − − η φ θ φ . 
 
Proof of Proposition 4   27
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In so doing, we used  1 ln (1 )exp( )/( ) tm t t h zh c A πδ α + =−  and  ) /( ) 1 ( ξη π t e t q c − = . The sign of 
the effect on savings is ambiguous as follows: 
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The effects of the education subsidy on health spending and savings are ambiguous.   
Again, the health subsidy has no effect on the balanced growth rate as in Proposition 3. 
Setting  1 = θ  in (A-12), the condition for   0 / > ∞ e d dg π  becomes: 
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The RHS of this inequality is positive but less than one under φ φ > − 1.   28
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1.  For example, health spending accounted for 13% of GDP during 1990-1998 in the United 
States, and nearly 9% of GDP in other advanced countries according to the World Bank 
(2002), amounting to a per capita health expenditure at 2,000 US dollars or more per year. 
On the other hand, in countries with very low life expectancy, health expenditures per 
capita were mostly below 50 US dollars per year,  e.g. merely one US dollar in Liberia and 
below ten US dollars in other eight such countries in 1997.  
2.  The Life Tables give death rates for each 5 year age gap, e.g.  65 , 60 25 , 20 ... , d d . The rate of 
survival from age 20 to 65 is computed as the product  ) 1 )...( 1 )( 1 ( 65 , 60 30 , 25 25 , 20 d d d − − − . 
3.  The 20% saving rate is close to the 22% ratio of private investment to GDP in countries 
with life expectancy in 1960 above 65 for the period 1960-1989. In these countries the 
ratio of public education spending to GDP is about 6%. With a 60% education subsidy, 
the corresponding figure for the ratio of total education spending to GDP is thus 10% to 
meet the 6% ratio of public education spending to GDP. Since there are substantial 
government subsidies on education and health expenditures in many OECD countries, the 
60% subsidy rates are plausible figures for these countries on average.  
4.  Life expectancy at birth in China was only 36 years in 1960, but exceeded 70 in recent 
years.    31
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1870 41.4  2244  --  --  --  --  1870-
89  
19.1  
1890 43.5  3101 1.62  --  --  --  1890-
1913 
18.3 
1910 51.9  4538 1.90  --  --  1.5  1914-
38 
17.0  
1930 59.7  5642 1.09  4.0  0.25  3.2  1939-
49 
15.2  
1950 68.2  8605 2.11  5.3  0.40  4.4  1950-
73 
19.7  
1970 70.8 12815  1.99  8.9  0.70  7.5  1974-
87 
18.0  
1990 75.4 18258  1.77  13.1  0.80  7.4  1990-
2000  
16.3  




Notes: Sources of data are as follows. a and f. US Census Bureau (1975, 2004). b and c. Table 12.10, 
Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995); Figures for 2000 are calculated using Tables 1.1.6 and CA1-3, 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Tables, 2005, US Department of Commerce. d and e. 
NIPA Tables, and Table B236-247 in US Census Bureau (1975).  g. Figures prior to 1987 are from 
Maddison (1992); Figures for 1990 and 2000 are from NIPA Tables. 
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 FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 




















































































































Numerical Results with 60% Subsidies on Health and Education Spending 
Figure 3a























































growth rate rate of survival
Figure 3d
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